Abstract. We give improved bounds on the preimage security of the three "classical" double-block-length, doublecall, blockcipher-based compression functions, these being Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM and Hirose's scheme. For Hirose's scheme, we show that an adversary must make at least 2 2n−5 blockcipher queries to achieve chance 0.5 of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range. For Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM we show that at least 2 2n−10 queries are necessary. These bounds improve upon the previous best bounds of Ω(2 n ) queries, and are optimal up to a constant factor since the compression functions in question have range of size 2 2n .
Introduction
Almost as soon as the idea of turning a blockcipher into a hash function appeared [13] , it became evident that, for typical blockciphers and security expectations, the hash function needs to output a digest that is considerably larger than the blockcipher's block size. Consequently, many proposals of double-block-length, or more generally multiblock-length, hash functions have appeared in the literature. In this article we focus on a subclass of double-blocklength constructions, where a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function makes two calls to a blockcipher of 2n-bit key and n-bit block.
Recently, for all three well-known members of this class-those being Tandem-DM [8] , Abreast-DM [8] and Hirose's construction [6] -collision resistance has been successfully resolved [4, 6, 9, 10] : for Abreast-DM and Hirose's scheme, Ω(2 n ) queries to the underlying blockcipher are needed to obtain a non-vanishing advantage in finding a collision. For Tandem-DM, Ω(2 n−log n ) queries are needed, which is almost optimal ignoring log factors. On the other hand, the corresponding situation for preimage resistance is far less satisfactory. Up to now, it has been an open problem to prove preimage resistance for values of q higher than 2 n for either Abreast-DM, Tandem-DM or Hirose. This is not to say that no dedicated preimage security proofs have appeared in the literature. For instance, Lee, Stam and Steinberger [10] provide a preimage resistance bound for Tandem-DM that is a lot closer to 2 n than a straightforward implication [14] of their collision bound would give. However, a "natural barrier" occurs once 2 n queries are reached: namely, a blockcipher "loses randomness" after being queried Ω(2 n ) times on the same key (for example, when 2 n − 1 queries have been made to a blockcipher under a given key, the answer to the last query under that key is deterministic). Going beyond the 2 n barrier seemed to require either a very technical probabilistic analysis, or some brand new idea. In this paper, we show a new idea which delivers tight bounds in a quite pain-free and untechnical fashion.
OUR CONTRIBUTION. In this paper, we prove that various compression functions that turn a blockcipher of 2n-bit key into a double-block-length hash function, have preimage resistance close to the optimal 2 2n in the ideal cipher model. Our analysis covers many practically relevant proposals, such as Abreast-DM, Hirose-DM and Tandem-DM. Bounds for the case n = 128 are depicted in Figure 1 (with α = q 1/2 /2 for Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM). At the heart of our result are so-called "super queries", a new technique to restrict the advantage of an adaptive preimage-finding adversary.
To build some intuition for our result, let us start with considering the much easier problem of constructing a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function H based on two 3n-bit to n-bit smaller underlying primitives f and f
′ . An obvious approach is simply to concatenate the outputs of f and f ′ , that is let H(B) = f (B)∥f ′ (B) for B ∈ {0, 1} 3n . If f and f ′ are modeled as independently sampled, ideally random functions, then it is not hard to see that H behaves ideally as well. In particular, it is preimage resistant up to 2 2n queries (to f and f ′ ). When switching to a blockcipher-based scenario, it is natural to replace f and f ′ in the construction above by E, resp. E ′ , both run in Davies-Meyer mode. In other words, for blockciphers E and E ′ both with 2n-bit keys and operating on n-bit blocks,
define H(A∥B) = (E B (A) ⊕ A)∥(E ′ B (A) ⊕ A) where A ∈ {0, 1}
n and B ∈ {0, 1} 2n . While there is every reason to believe this construction maintains preimage resistance up to 2 2n queries, the standard proof technique against adaptive adversaries falls short significantly. Indeed, the usual argument goes that the ith query an adversary makes to E using key K will return an answer uniform from a set of size at least 2 n − (i − 1) and thus the probability of hitting a prespecified value is at most 1/(2 n − (i − 1)) < 1/(2 n − q). Unfortunately, once q approaches 2 n , the denominator tends to zero (rendering the bound useless). As a result, one cannot hope to prove anything beyond 2 n queries using this method. This restriction holds even for a "typical" bound of type q/(2 n − q) 2 . When considering non-adaptive adversaries only, the situation is far less grim. Such adversaries need to commit to all queries in advance, which allows bounding the probability of each individual query hitting a prespecified value by 2 −n . While obviously there are dependencies (in the answers), these can safely be ignored when a union bound is later used to combine the various individual queries. Since the q offset has disappeared from the denominator, the typical bound q/(2 n ) 2 would give the desired security. Our solution, then, is to force an adaptive adversary to behave non-adaptively. As this might sound a bit cryptic, let us be more precise. Consider an adversary adaptively making queries to the blockcipher, using the same key throughout. As soon as the number of queries to this key passes a certain threshold, we give the remaining queries to the blockcipher using this very key for free. We will refer to this event as a super query. Since these free queries are all asked in one go, they can be dealt with non-adaptively, preempting the problems that occur (in standard proofs) due to adaptive queries. Nonetheless, for every super query we need to hand out a very large number of free queries, which can aid the adversary. Thus we need to limit the amount of super queries an adversary can make by setting the threshold that triggers a super query sufficiently high. In fact, we set the threshold at exactly half 4 the total number of queries that can be made under a given key (i.e., it is set at 2 n /2 queries). This effectively doubles the adversary's query budget, since for every query the adversary makes it can get another one later "for free" (if it keeps on making queries under the same key), but such a doubling of the number of queries does not lead to an unacceptable deterioration of the security bound.
With this new technique in hand, we revisit the proofs of preimage resistance of the three main double-blocklength, double-call constructions (Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM and Hirose). An additional technical problem is that these compression functions each make two calls to the same blockcipher, as opposed to using two calls to independent blockciphers (we discuss the latter, somewhat easier scenario in Appendix A). Ideally, to get a good bound, one would like to query the two calls necessary for a single compression function evaluation in conjunction (this would allow using the randomness of both calls simultaneously, potentially leading to a denominator 2 2n as desired for preimage resistance). For instance, in the context of collision resistance for Hirose-DM and Abreast-DM corresponding queries are grouped in cycles (of length 2 and 6, respectively) and all queries in a cycle are made simultaneously: if the adversary makes one query in a cycle, the remaining queries are handed out for free. Care has to be taken that these free queries and the free queries due to super queries do not reinforce each other to untenable levels. For Hirose's scheme, there are no problems as the free queries introduced by a super query necessarily consist of full cycles only. The corresponding (upper) bound on the preimage finding advantage is 16q/2 2n which is as desired, up to a small factor. For Abreast-DM, however, the cyclic nature can no longer be exploited: any super query introduces many partial cycles, yet freely completing these might well trigger a new super query, etc.! Luckily, the original preimage proof for Tandem-DM [10] (which does not involve cycles) provides a way out of this conundrum. The downside however is that our preimage bound for Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM is slightly less tight than that for Hirose's scheme. Ignoring negligible terms, it grows roughly as 16 √ q/2 n . Although this is faster than one might wish for (as can be seen in Figure 1 ), it does imply that Ω(2 2n ) queries are required to find a preimage with constant probability. To compare numerical bounds for n = 128, Hirose's scheme requires about 2 251 blockcipher queries to achieve chance 0.5 of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range, while Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM require 2 246 queries.
RELATED WORK. The problem of preimage security for double-block-length compression functions beyond 2 n has previously been tackled by Krause, Armknecht and Fleischmann [7] . They discuss what can be regarded as variations of calling Davies-Meyer twice in parallel (using distinct blockciphers). For one such compression function, they prove a Ω(2 2n ) preimage resistance bound. Their original analysis predated our work, but was technically flawed, and we obtained our results after discovering these flaws. We emphasize, however, that the techniques we developed are entirely disjoint from those in their original preprint [7] . After we pointed out the technical problems to Krause et al. they (independently) found a second analysis using rather similar ideas to ours, which is contained in the new version of their preprint.
The analysis of Krause et al. contains a number of additional elements besides the super query idea, such as conditioning on the number of preimages present for a given key. In Appendix A we show that, to analyze the preimage security for a class encompassing that targeted by Krause et al., the use of super queries alone suffices. The proof thus obtained is significantly simpler, and the bound is slightly sharper, as well.
The model
m . We call m the key size and n the block length of the blockcipher. It is customary to write
is a permutation). Henceforth, we will restrict to the case m = 2n and we define N = 2 n . A compression function H is blockcipher-based if, in its execution, it has access to a blockcipher. In this paper, we only discuss double-block-length, double-call constructions, meaning that H is a function from 3n-bits to 2n-bits making two calls to some underlying blockcipher E. (This definition will become more concrete in the next sections.)
As our preimage security notion for H, we adopt everywhere preimage resistance in the information theoretic setting [14] . In this preimage resistance experiment, a computationally unbounded adversary A with oracle access to a uniformly sampled blockcipher E : {0, 1}
2n × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n selects and announces a point C ∈ {0, 1} 2n , before making queries to E. We allow A to query both E and E −1 . Afterueries to E, the query history of A is the set of triples
We say A succeeds or finds a preimage if its query history Q contains the means of computing a preimage of C, in the sense that there exist values B ∈ {0, 1} 3n ,
are in the query history Q, H(B) = C and the two queries used to evaluate H(B) are precisely E K1 (X 1 ) and E K2 (X 2 ). In this case, we also say Q contains a preimage of C. We let be the predicate that is true if and only if Q contains a preimage of C, where C is an elided-but-understood parameter of the predicate. We define Adv
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A making at mostueries, and where the probability is taken over the randomness of E as well as over the adversary's coins, if any. For Tandem-DM, it turns out that the everywhere preimage resistance notion is slightly too strong, as there is one weak point (namely 0 2n ) in the range, for which finding preimages is a bit easier. A simple adaptation of the everywhere preimage resistance definition is to disallow the adversary to choose C = 0 2n as the target point [10] ; we denote the corresponding advantage as Adv
(We will still use the same predicate Preim(Q) though.) A standard assumption to make in ideal cipher proofs is that "the adversary never makes a query to which it already knows the answer". By this it is meant, for example, that one can assume the adversary never makes a query E K (X), obtaining an answer Y , and then makes the query E −1 K (Y ) (which will necessarily be answered by X). In the current context, where we consider adversaries making 2 n queries or more, this assumption should be more precisely restated as "the adversary never makes a query that will result in a triple (X, K, Y ) which is already present in the query history". (This latter assumption can be made without loss of generality using the fact that E K (·) is a permutation.) Indeed, if an adversary has made 2 n − 1 queries under a key K, the result of the last query under that key is predetermined, and thus the adversary "already knows" the answer to this query. However, one should not forbid the adversary from making this query, since the query may be necessary to complete a preimage.
Our security proofs also use the notion of "free" queries. Formally, these can be modeled as queries which the adversary is "forced" to query (under certain conditions), but for which the adversary is not charged: they do not count towards the maximum ofueries which the adversary is allowed. However, these queries become part of the adversary's query history, just like other queries. In particular, the adversary is not allowed, later, to remake these queries "on its own" (due to the previously discussed assumption that the adversary never makes a query which it already owns).
Preimage security results for Hirose's scheme
Hirose [6] introduced his 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function making two calls to a blockcipher of 2n-bit key over 10 years after Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM (see the next Sections). Hirose's construction ( Figure 2 ) is simpler than either Abreast-DM or Tandem-DM and in particular uses a single keying schedule for the top and bottom blockciphers. Moreover, Hirose himself already proved birthday-type collision resistance for his construction in the ideal cipher model, thereby pre-dating similar collision resistance analyses for Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM. Previously, Lee and Kwon [9] have shown that Adv Proof. Let U ∥V ∈ {0, 1} 2n be the point to invert (chosen by the adversary before it makes any queries to E). We upper bound the probability that, inueries, the adversary finds a point A∥L∥M ∈ {0, 1} 3n such that Hir(A∥L∥M ) = U ∥V .
When the adversary makes a forward query E L∥M (A) we give it for free, also, the answer to the query E L∥M (A ⊕ c). Moreover when the adversary makes a backward query E −1
L∥M (R), we give it for free the answer to the forward query E L∥M (A ⊕ c). Also, we assume that the adversary never makes a query to which it knows the answer (in the sense discussed in Section 2). Thus the elements of the adversary's query history Q can be paired into adjacent pairs of the form (A, L∥M, R), (A ⊕ c, L∥M, S). We call such a pair an "adjacent query pair".
We now give further free queries to the adversary, in the fashion described next. After each adjacent query pair has been completed (namely, after the adversary has received the response to both its query and its associated free query, and after these have been placed in the query history), we check whether the key used for the latest query is such that the (current) query history contains exactly N/2 queries with this key. If so, we give all remaining queries under this key for free to the adversary. There will be exactly N/2 such queries, which can be paired into N/4 adjacent query pairs. We insert these N/2 free queries into the query history pair-by-pair (to maintain, mostly for conceptual simplicity, the adjacent pair structure of the query history). We note that, after these free queries have been inserted into the query history, the adversary cannot make any more queries under this key, since the adversary is assumed never to make a query to which it knows the answer.
When N/2 free queries are given to the adversary in the fashion just described, we say that a super query occurs. We also use the term "super query" to denote the set of N/2 free queries thus returned to the adversary. Every adjacent query pair in the query history is either part of a super query, or not; in the latter case, we call the adjacent query pair a "normal" adjacent query pair; we also say a single query is "normal" to indicate it is not part of a super query. 5 Moreover, we keep track, in the query history (e.g. by an additional bit of data attached to each query), of which queries are normal, and of which queries belong to a super query (with every query being one or the other and not both).
We say that an adjacent query pair
Thus the adversary obtains a preimage of U ∥V precisely if it obtains a winning adjacent query pair. This can occur in one of two ways: either the winning query pair is part of a super query, or not. We let SuperQueryWin(Q) denote the event that the adversary obtains a winning query pair that is part of a super query, and NormalQueryWin(Q) the event that the adversary obtains a winning query pair of normal queries. It thus suffices to upper bound
Here probabilities are taken (as usual) over the adversary's randomness (if any) and over the randomness of the ideal cipher.
We first upper bound Pr[NormalQueryWin(Q)]. Note that when the adversary makes, say, a forward query E L∥M (A), at most N/2 − 2 queries (counting free queries) have been previously answered with the key L∥M , since otherwise a super query for the key L∥M would have occured. Thus the value R = E L∥M (A) comes uniformly at random from a set of size at least N/2 + 2 ≥ N/2, and there is chance at most 2/(N/2) = 4/N that either A ⊕ R = U or A ⊕ R = V (this is also true if U = V ). If, say, A ⊕ R = U , there is further chance at most 1/(N/2) = 2/N that the free query E L∥M (A ⊕ c) returns A ⊕ c ⊕ V , since the answer to the free query comes uniformly at random from a set of size at least N/2 + 1 ≤ N/2. Other cases (e.g. when A ⊕ R = V , and when the adversary makes a backward query −1 L∥M (R)) are similarly analyzed, showing that the adversary's chance of triggering the event NormalQueryWin(Q) at any given query is at most (4/N )(2/N ) = 8/N 2 . Since the adversary makesueries total, we therefore have
We now bound Pr[SuperQueryWin(Q)]. Say a super query is about to occur on key L∥M , meaning that the value of E L∥M (·) is already known on exactly N/2 points paired into N/4 query pairs. Let A, A ⊕ c be in the domain of the super query. (We say that a point B ∈ {0, 1} n is "in the domain of the super query" if
is not yet know, and will be queried as part of the super query; note that a point A ∈ {0, 1} n is in the domain of the super query if and only if A ⊕ c is in the domain of the super query.) Then the probability that E L∥M (A) = U is either 0 if U is not in the range of the super query (meaning there is a normal query E L∥M (B) = U already present in the query history when the super query is made), or else is exactly 2/N , since the value of E L∥M (A) returned by the super query is uniform at random in a set of size N/2. Thus, by a similar argument on V , the probability that E L∥M (A) ∈ {U, V } is at most 4/N . Conditioning on the event E L∥M (A) ∈ {U, V }, the probability that We now observe that at most q/(N/4) super queries can ever occur, since each super query requires a "setup" cost of N/4 queries. Thus
Summing (1) and (2) Proof. By setting q = cN 2 for some 0 < c < 1, the bound from Theorem 1 simplifies to
Again, setting c = 1/32 gives us the claimed result.
Preimage security results for Abreast-DM
Abreast-DM, pictured in Figure 3 , is one of the classical schemes for turning a 2n-bit key blockcipher into a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function. It was proposed by Lai and Massey in the same paper as Tandem-DM [8] . The collision resistance of Abreast-DM was independently resolved by Fleischmann, Gorski and Lucks [4] and Lee and Kwon [9] , who both showed birthday-type collision resistance for Abreast-DM. Previously, Hirose [5] had given a collision resistance analysis for a general class of compression functions that included Abreast-DM as a special case, but under the assumption that the top and bottom blockciphers of the diagram be distinct. This assumption considerably simplifies the analysis (see also the later generalization byÖzen and Stam [12] ). Previously, Lee and Kwon [9] have shown that Adv epre Abr (q) ≤ 6q/(2 n − 6q) 2 . Although our bound for Abreast-DM (Theorem 2) is not as tight as our bound for Hirose's scheme (Theorem 2), it is clear from Corollary 2 below that our result significantly improves this bound. Theorem 2. Let Abr : {0, 1} 3n → {0, 1} 2n be the blockcipher-based compression function depicted in Figure 3 . Let α > 0 be an integer. Then
Proof. Let U ∥V be the point to invert, chosen by the adversary before any queries are made to E. Unlike in the proof for Hirose's scheme, we do not give the adversary a free query after each query it makes. However, we still give the adversary "super queries" for free. More precisely, whenever the adversary has made N/2 queries under a given key K∥L, and after the (N/2)-th such query has been answered and placed in the query history, we give the remaining N/2 queries under the key K∥L for free to the adversary, in any order. In this case, we say that a super query occurs; every query in the query history is either part of a super query, or not; in the latter case we call the query a "normal query". (Thus, in this theorem, normal queries are exactly the non-free queries.) Unlike in the proof of Theorem 1, there is no notion of an adjacent query pair. However, like in the proof of Theorem 1, we alert the reader to the fact that a "super query" consists of a set of N/2 queries, whereas a "normal query" is a single query.
We define an event Lucky(Q) on the query history; Lucky(Q) occurs if
The adversary obtains a preimage of U ∥V precisely if it obtains queries of the form (A, B∥L, R), (B, L∥A, S) such that A ⊕ R = U and B ⊕ S = V , where B is bitwise complementation of B.
It is easy to check that these two queries must be distinct, otherwise one obtains the contradiction B = A = L = B. We call two such queries a "winning pair" of queries. Note, of course, that the queries in a winning pair need not be adjacent in the query history. We speak of the "first" and "second" query in a winning pair referring to the order in which they appear in the query history.
Let WinNormal(Q) be the event that the adversary obtains a winning pair in which the second query is a normal query. Let WinSuper 1 (Q) be the event that the adversary obtains a winning pair in which the second query is part of a super query and the first is either normal or part of a super query, but is not part of the same super query as the second. Finally let WinSuper 2 (Q) be the event that the adversary obtains a winning pair in which both queries of the pair are part of the same super query. It is then clear that if the adversary wins, one of the events
occurs. In particular, thus, one of the four events
Lucky(Q), WinNormal(Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q), WinSuper 1 (Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q), WinSuper 2 (Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)
must occur if the adversary wins. We upper bound the probability of each of these four events and sum the upper bounds in order to obtain an upper bound on the adversary's advantage.
We start by upper bounding Pr[Lucky(Q)]. For this we introduce two new events. Let Q n be the restriction of Q to normal queries, and let Q s be the restriction of Q to queries that are part of super queries. Let Lucky n (Q) be the event that either
The event Lucky s (Q) is likewise defined with respect to Q s . Obviously, Lucky(Q) =⇒ Lucky n (Q) ∨ Lucky s (Q), so it suffices to upper bound Lucky n (Q) and Lucky s (Q) and to sum these upper bounds.
Since every answer to a normal query, forward or backward, comes at random from a set of size at least N/2, and since at most q normal queries are made, we have that
To 
Since E(Z i,j ) ≤ 2/N for each i and j, we have E(Z) ≤ (2q/N )(N/2)(2/N ) = 2q/N . Therefore, by Markov's inequality, the probability that 
We now upper bound Pr[WinNormal(Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)]. For this we use a "wish list" argument similar to that of [10] . As the adversary makes queries, we maintain two sequences W T and W B called wish lists. These are initially empty. For each query (X, K∥L, Y ) added to the query history (whether normal or part of a super query) we update the wish lists as follows:
We emphasize that W B and W T are sequences, not sets. The following properties are easy to check: (i) a query never "adds itself" to a wish list (namely, the queries inserted into the wish lists-if any-as a result of query (X, K∥L, Y ) being added to the query history, are distinct from (X, K∥L, Y ) itself); (ii) the elements of W T are all distinct from one another, and the elements of W B are all distinct from one another-namely, the same triple is never added twice to a wish list; (iii) the adversary obtains a winning pair precisely if a query is ever added to its query history that is already a member of one of its wish lists before the updating of the wish lists for that query (by property (i), however, we could equally well say "after the updating of the wish lists for that query"). Moreover, as long as ¬Lucky(Q) holds, the wish lists never exceed length 2α.
Let E K∥L (X) be a query made to E during the adversary's attack (either a normal query, or as part of a super query). If, at the moment when the query is being made, there is an element of the form (X, K∥L, Y ) in (at least) one of the wish lists for some Y ∈ {0, 1} n , then we say this wish list element is being "wished for" when the query E K∥L (X) is made. We similarly say the wish list element (X, K∥L, Y ) is being "wished for" if the query E 
NormalWishGranted B,i so by a union bound
Because each wish list element can only be wished for once and because a normal query is answered at random uniformly from a set of size at least N/2, we have
and therefore
We now upper bound 
Assume, for a given i, that the i-th element of W T (say) is (X, K∥L, Y ), and that a super query is about to be made for the key K∥L, and that X is in the domain of the super query. Then the probability that E K∥L (X) = Y is at most 2/N (more precisely, it is exactly 2/N unless Y is not in the super query's range, in which case it is 0). Thus, arguing similarly for the list W B , we obtain that
We finally bound 
It is easy to see that probability (when the super query is made) that these latter equalities hold is at most (2/N ) · (1/ (N/2 − 1) ). Since at most q/(N/2) super queries are made, we therefore have
Finally, we obtain the theorem by summing (3), (4), (5) Proof. By setting α = q 1/2 /2 (note that α is allowed to depend on q), the bound from Theorem 2 simplifies to
Suppose that q = (cN ) 2 for some 0 < c < 1, then this bound can be rewritten as
For 4ec < 1, this tends 16c, so setting c = 1/32 gives us the claimed result.
Preimage security results for Tandem-DM
The Tandem-DM compression function, proposed by Lai and Massey in 1992 [8] , is a 3n-bit to 2n-bit compression function based on two applications of a blockcipher of 2n-bit key and n-bit word length (Figure 4 ). The first (flawed) proof of collision security for Tandem-DM (by Fleischmann, Gorski and Lucks [3] ) did not appear until 2009. Later, Lee, Stam and Steinberger [10] gave a correct collision resistance analysis of Tandem-DM showing that indeed it has birthday-type collision security in the ideal cipher model (necessitating at least 2 120.8 queries to break when the output length is 2n = 256 bits). They also showed preimage resistance up to essentially 2 128 queries (for n = 128), once 0 n ∥0 n is excluded as challenge digest. Our new bound is identical to the bound we gave for Abreast-DM, so in particular 2 2n−10 queries are needed to obtain a preimage with probability ∼ 0.5 (Corollary 3).
2n be the blockcipher-based compression function depicted in Figure 4 . Let α > 0 be an integer. Then
Proof. Let U ∥V ̸ = 0 n ∥0 n be the point to invert, chosen by the adversary before making any queries to E. We manage free queries exactly as for Abreast-DM; more precisely, when N/2 queries are made to E under a given key, we give the remaining N/2 queries under that key for free to the adversary, and this constitutes a "super query". No other free queries are given.
In the case of Tandem-DM, the adversary obtains a preimage of U ∥V precisely if it obtains queries of the form (A, B∥L, R), (B, L∥R, S) such that A ⊕ R = U , B ⊕ S = V . It is easy to see these two queries must be distinct, otherwise we would have A = B = L = R = S and therefore U ∥V = 0 n ∥0 n . We call two queries as above a "winning pair" of queries, where the two elements of a winning pair need not be adjacent in the query history (and could be in any order). We speak again of the "first" and "second" query in a winning pair referring to the order in which they appear in the query history.
We define the events Lucky(Q), WinNormal(Q), WinSuper 1 (Q) and WinSuper 2 (Q) as in the proof of Theorem 2 (but with respect, of course, to the new definition of "winning pair"). If the adversary wins, one of the events
must occur. We upper bound the probability of each of these events separately.
As in the case of Theorem 2, we have
To upper bound Pr[WinNormal(Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)], we again use wish lists. There are two wish lists, W T and W B , which are initially empty and which are updated after each new query (X, K∥L, Y ) placed into the query history, according to the following rules:
The same four properties from Theorem 2 are easy to check: (i) a query never "adds itself" to a wish list (this uses U ∥V ̸ = 0 n ∥0 n ); (ii) the elements within each wish list are all distinct from one another; (iii) the adversary obtains a winning pair precisely if it obtains a query that is already in one of its wish lists (at the moment of insertion of that query into the query history). And by definition of Lucky(Q), the wish lists never exceed length 2α as long ¬Lucky(Q) holds.
Let NormalWishGranted T,i , NormalWishGranted B,i be defined as in (the proof of) Theorem 2. Then, using exactly the same analysis as in the proof of Theorem 2, we have that
and that
Then also arguing word for word as in the proof of Theorem 2, we find that
We finally bound Pr[WinSuper 2 (Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)]. Note the event WinSuper 2 (Q) can only occur when a super query occurs for a key of the form L∥L, and when that super query results in the triples (U ⊕L, L∥L, L), (L, L∥L, L⊕ V ) being added to the query history. The probability that E L∥L (U ⊕ L) = L is at most 2/N , and, conditioned on the
. Since at most 2q/N super queries occur, we thus find that
The theorem follows by summing (7), (8), (9) and (10).
⊓ ⊔
As for Abreast-DM, we have the following corollary (with the same proof):
Corollary 3. We have
where the o(1) term tends to 0 as n → ∞.
m+n is the input to the compression function, the digest C is computed as 
In particular, an adversary must ask at least N 2 /16 = 2 2n−4 queries to have chance 0.5 of obtaining a collision.
Proof. We largely follow the proof we gave for Hirose's scheme (Theorem 1). Let C be the point that the adversary has chosen to invert (before gaining access to the blockciphers). On top of theueries the adversary wants to make, we give it several queries for free, as follows:
1. (Normal forward query) If the adversary queries E K (X), we also give it for free E
is given for free (and vice versa, given an inverse E ′ query, the appropriate E query is added). 3. (Super query) Given N/2 queries to E all using the same key K, all the remaining queries using that key K are given for free. Moreover, all remaining queries to E ′ using the corresponding key K ′ = ξ(K) are given for free as well.
We note that, as a result of these additional queries, the elements
are always added to the query history as a pair. (Here we use subscript notation in the query history to resolve ambiguity about the relevant primitive.) Moreover, thanks to property P1, any pair uniquely corresponds to some B (for which (K, X) = F (B) and (K ′ , X ′ ) = F ′ (B)) and we call it winning iff H(B) = C, i.e. iff C = G(B, Y, Y ′ ). To find a preimage, an adversary needs to create a winning pair in its query history (composed of both the queries it asks explicitly and the free queries). We can distinguish between three types of winning pairs, depending on the free queries involved. Let NormalQueryWin(Q) denote the event that the adversary obtains a winning pair that is not part of a super query and whose first query was a forward query, let InverseQueryWin(Q) denote the event that the winning pair is not part of a super query whose first query was an inverse query, and finally let SuperQueryWin(Q) denote the event that the adversary obtains a winning pair that is part of a super query. Then the preimage-finding advantage is upper bounded by
(Here the probabilities are over the choice of both E and E ′ , and over the adversary's randomness, when present.) We will bound these three probabilities; a simple sum then leads to the theorem statement.
To bound Pr[NormalQueryWin(Q)], consider a single query pair 
) that combines with K, X, and Y to complete the preimage. Since there have been at most N/2 queries to E under K and, similarly, at most N/2 queries to E ′ under K ′ , the probability of hitting both X and Y ′ is upper bounded by 1/(N − N/2) 2 = 4/N 2 (again exploiting independence of E and E ′ ). The case that the pair was prompted by an
is analogous, based on property P3b. Note that a query is either a forward or an inverse query (but not both), so by a union bound the (combined) total contribution of these two events to the adversary's advantage is at most 4q/N 2 . All that is left is bounding Pr[SuperQueryWin(Q)]. We first note that key consistency (property P4) ensures that only "regular" queries can count towards causing a super query. Since the threshold is N/2, this immediately implies that an adversary can only ever cause 2q/N super queries. For any individual super query, we claim that the success probability is upper bounded by 2/N , leading to Pr[SuperQueryWin(Q)] ≤ 4q/N 2 . A super query considers of N/2 query pairs. For each pair, we can use the exact same derivation as we used for Pr[NormalQueryWin(Q)] to argue that it succeeds with probability at most 4/N 2 . A union bound over the N/2 pairs constituting a super query gives the claimed 2/N bound.
B Optimizing the bounds
In the previous analyses, we have set the threshold that triggers a super query at exactly half the total number of queries that can be made under a given key, that is, N/2. In general, we can allow a super query to occur right after an adversary makes (1/2 + θ)N queries for a given key, where −1/2 < θ < 1/2 is a parameter to be optimized later.
Furthermore, event Lucky(Q) appearing in the security proof of Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM can be decomposed by using a certain parameter, leading to an improved bound on the probability of Lucky(Q). Note that event Lucky(Q)
As before, let Q n be the restriction of Q to normal queries, and let Q s be the restriction of Q to queries that are part of super queries. For −1/2 < δ < 1/2, we define Lucky n (Q) to be the event that either
Similarly, Lucky s (Q) is the event that either
Since Lucky(Q) =⇒ Lucky n (Q) ∨ Lucky s (Q), we can upper bound Lucky n (Q) and Lucky s (Q) and sum these upper bounds. Using a similar argument to the original proof, we can show that
Note that we obtain the original inequality by setting θ = δ = 0.
With the same definition of events WinNormal(Q), WinSuper 1 (Q) and WinSuper 2 (Q), we have the following parameterized bounds.
Pr[WinNormal(Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)] ≤
Pr[WinSuper 1 (Q) ∧ ¬Lucky(Q)] ≤ 4α
Here we are using a super query threshold θ ′ , which is distinct from the parameter θ used in the bound of Pr[Lucky(Q)]. To summarize, we obtain the following theorem. 
HIERARCHICAL OPTIMIZATION. Let
We minimize A + B + C + D by the following steps.
B is O(q/N
3 ), which is sufficiently small for q ≈ N 2 . Therefore, we minimize A by taking θ ′ as small as possible. 
Consider the two factors
, each of which comes from the denominators of C and D, respectively. For a fixed value of the first factor, the second factor is maximized by setting δ = θ. Then we have
Here we ignore the exponent appearing in C, assuming it is sufficiently large. Substituting this value into C, we obtain 
+θ (N,q) ) .
This optimized bound is compared to the original one in Fig. 5 . Numerically, the optimized bound requires about 2 247.6 blockcipher queries to achieve chance 0.5 of inverting a randomly chosen point in the range for Abreast-DM and Tandem-DM. Thus we have 1.6-bit gain over the original bound. 
